Europe has been in a financial crisis since 2007. When the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers endangered the credit of financial
institutions, private credit was replaced by the credit of the state,
revealing an unrecognized flaw in the euro. By transferring their right
to print money to the European Central Bank (ECB), member countries
exposed themselves to the risk of default, like Third World countries
heavily indebted in a foreign currency. Commercial banks loaded with
weaker countries’ government bonds became potentially insolvent.
There
is a parallel between the ongoing euro crisis and the international
banking crisis of 1982. Back then, the International Monetary Fund saved
the global banking system by lending just enough money to heavily
indebted countries; default was avoided, but at the cost of a lasting
depression. Latin America suffered a lost decade.
Germany
is playing the same role today as the IMF did then. The setting
differs, but the effect is the same. Creditors are shifting the entire
burden of adjustment on to the debtor countries and avoiding their own
responsibility.
The
euro crisis is a complex mixture of banking and sovereign-debt
problems, as well as divergences in economic performance that have given
rise to balance-of-payments imbalances within the eurozone. The
authorities did not understand the complexity of the crisis, let alone
see a solution. So they tried to buy time.
Usually,
that works. Financial panics subside, and the authorities realize a
profit on their intervention. But not this time, because the financial
problems were combined with a process of political disintegrattion.When
the European Union was created, it was the embodiment of an open
society – a voluntary association of equal states that surrendered part
of their sovereignty for the common good. The euro crisis is now turning
the EU into something fundamentally different, dividing member
countries into two classes – creditors and debtors – with the creditors
in charge.
As
the strongest creditor country, Germany has emerged as the hegemon.
Debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums for financing their
government debt. This is reflected in their cost of financing in
general. To make matters worse, the Bundesbank remains committed to an
outmoded monetary doctrine rooted in Germany’s traumatic experience with
inflation. As a result, it recognizes only inflation as a threat to
stability, and ignores deflation, which is the real threat today.
Moreover, Germany’s insistence on austerity for debtor countries can
easily become counterproductive by increasing the debt ratio as GDP
falls.
There
is a real danger that a two-tier Europe will become permanent. Both
human and financial resources will be attracted to the center, leaving
the periphery permanently depressed. But the periphery is seething with
discontent.
Europe’s
tragedy is not the result of an evil plot, but stems, rather, from a
lack of coherent policies. As in ancient Greek tragedies, misconceptions
and a sheer lack of understanding have had unintended but fateful
consequences.
Germany,
as the largest creditor country, is in charge, but refuses to take on
additional liabilities; as a result, every opportunity to resolve the
crisis has been missed. The crisis spread from Greece to other deficit
countries, eventually calling into question the euro’s very survival.
Since a breakup of the euro would cause immense damage, Germany always
does the minimum necessary to hold it together.
Most
recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has backed ECB President
Mario Draghi, leaving Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann isolated. This
will enable the ECB to put a lid on the borrowing costs of countries
that submit to an austerity program under the supervision of the Troika
(the IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission). That will save the
euro, but it is also a step toward the permanent division of Europe into
debtors and creditors.
The
debtors are bound to reject a two-tier Europe sooner or later. If the
euro breaks up in disarray, the common market and the EU will be
destroyed, leaving Europe worse off than it was when the effort to unite
it began, owing to a legacy of mutual mistrust and hostility. The later
the breakup, the worse the ultimate outcome. So it is time to consider
alternatives that until recently would have been inconceivable.
In
my judgment, the best course of action is to persuade Germany to choose
between either leading the creation of a political union with genuine
burden-sharing, or leaving the euro.
Since
all of the accumulated debt is denominated in euros, it makes all the
difference who remains in charge of the monetary union.If Germany
left, the euro would depreciate. Debtor countries would regain their
competitiveness; their debt would diminish in real terms; and, with the
ECB under their control, the threat of default would disappear and their
borrowing costs would fall to levels comparable to that in the United
Kingdom.
The
creditor countries, by contrast, would incur losses on their claims and
investments denominated in euros and encounter stiffer competition at
home from other eurozone members. The extent of creditor countries’
losses would depend on the extent of the depreciation, giving them an
interest in keeping the depreciation within bounds.
After
initial dislocations, the eventual outcome would fulfill John Maynard
Keynes’ dream of an international currency system in which both
creditors and debtors share responsibility for maintaining stability.
And Europe would avert the looming depression.
The
same result could be achieved, with less cost to Germany, if Germany
chose to behave as a benevolent hegemon. That would mean implementing
the proposed European banking union; establishing a more or less level
playing field between debtor and creditor countries by establishing a
Debt Reduction Fund, and eventually converting all debt into Eurobonds;
and aiming at nominal GDP growth of up to 5%, so that Europe could grow its way out of excessive indebtedness.
Whether Germany decides to lead or leave, either alternative would be better than creating an unsustainable two-tier Europe.
The above article has been originally published in the project syndicate website : http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-germany-should-lead-or-leave-by-george-soros
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